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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 10-2249 
_______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
SHAWN DILLARD, 
 
       Appellant 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 1-08-cr-00270-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Yvette Kane 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 23, 2011 
_______________ 
 
Before:  BARRY, AMBRO, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 23, 2011) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 Shawn Dillard was indicted for participating in prostitution and various related 
activities.  At his trial, the Government briefly and unintentionally displayed a reference 
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to the fact that Dillard had taken a polygraph examination.  The District Court denied 
Dillard’s motion for a mistrial.  Dillard appeals.  We affirm.   
I. 
As we write solely for the parties, we recite only those facts necessary to our 
decision.  Dillard was a trooper for the Pennsylvania State Police.  One of his duties as a 
trooper was to conduct anti-prostitution patrols.  During the course of these patrols, 
Dillard took part in prostitution by, among other things, demanding sexual favors and 
money from women he detained and arrested.  He also informed prostitutes and pimps of 
undercover operations and law enforcement activities. 
In March 2009 Dillard was charged with multiple counts:  conspiring to impede 
the due administration of justice and to promote interstate prostitution in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 371 (Count One); impeding the due administration of justice in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1503 (Count Two); aiding and abetting interstate prostitution in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1952(a)(3) (Count Three); Hobbs Act extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1951(a) (Counts Four through Seven); and making false statements to law enforcement 
officials in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (Counts Eight and Nine).   
Dillard was tried in May 2009.  During the Government’s closing argument, the 
prosecutor displayed two inconsistent statements made by Dillard regarding his sexual 
involvement with a particular woman.  The prosecutor pulled up the first statement, with 
the pertinent language (“I did not have sex with her”) highlighted in bright yellow.  But, 
because a portion of the statement was cut off by the monitor, the prosecutor cropped and 
displayed only the relevant language, which was then read to the jury.  The prosecutor 
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did the same with the second statement, pulling up the complete document (which 
contained the highlighted words “I did have sex with her”), and then cropping the 
relevant portion.  The defense objected and moved for a mistrial because the second full 
statement contained a reference to Dillard’s “polygraph examination” in the first 
paragraph.  The District Court denied the motion.  The jury convicted Dillard of Counts 
Two, Three, Eight, and Nine, and acquitted him of Counts One, Four, Five, Six, and 
Seven.   
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a district court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial for 
an abuse of discretion.  United States v. Hakim, 344 F.3d 324, 328 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing 
United States v. Weaver, 267 F.3d 231, 245 (3d Cir. 2001)).   
On appeal, Dillard argues that the District Court abused its discretion by denying 
his motion for a mistrial because the Government’s “publishing” of the second statement, 
containing an inadmissible reference to Dillard’s polygraph examination, “severely 
damaged [his] testimony, which was the cornerstone of his defense, and effectively 
deprived him of his right to a fair trial.”  Dillard Br. 15.  We disagree. 
First, the facts belie Dillard’s argument.  As Chief Judge Kane stated when 
denying the motion for a mistrial, it was unlikely that members of the jury even saw the 
problematic phrase, as she was unable to read the document from where she sat.  The 
words were only on the screen for a few seconds, were not emphasized in any way, and 
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the relevant highlighted portion later cropped by the prosecutor was at the bottom of the 
page, far removed from the offending reference in the first paragraph.   
In any event, even if the jury did see the phrase, the error was harmless.  As the 
Government points out, “the evidence of [Dillard’s] guilt was overwhelming, consisting 
of eyewitness testimony of law enforcement officers, intercepted telephone 
conversations, the testimony of victims, telephone records[,] and Dillard’s own admission 
of sexual involvement with women he had arrested for prostitution.”  Government Br. 19-
20.  
Second, the two cases Dillard cites in support of his argument are distinguishable.  
In United States v. Murray, 784 F.2d 188 (6th Cir. 1986), an FBI agent testified that the 
defendant had been required to take a polygraph examination.  Id. at 188.  The Court in 
that case found that the disclosure was deliberate and the proof of guilt was not sufficient 
to hold that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 188-89.  The Court 
also concluded that an erroneous jury instruction—that the Government was not required 
to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt—required reversal.  Id.  None of that is true of 
this case, in which disclosure was fleeting and accidental, proof of guilt was 
overwhelming, and there were no independent grounds for a mistrial. 
Similarly, in United States v. Brevard, 739 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1984), an FBI agent 
testified that he questioned the defendant’s alibi and had asked him to take a polygraph 
examination.  Id. at 181.  After the trial judge struck the testimony and instructed the 
prosecutor to avoid any further reference to the polygraph, the FBI agent mentioned it 
again during cross-examination.  Id. at 181-82.  The District Court gave an instruction to 
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the jury to disregard any reference to the polygraph and allowed the trial to proceed.  Id. 
at 182.  On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court reversed, holding that the defendant’s alibi 
defense made critical the issue of his credibility and that the jury could have inferred that 
the defendant failed the polygraph because he was not indicted until after he took the 
examination.  Id. at 182-83.  Again, this is not true of our case, in which the evidence of 
Dillard’s guilt was overwhelming and did not turn on his testimony, and the context was 
not such that we could conclude that the jury could have made negative inferences about 
the results of the polygraph from the display of the second statement. 
*    *    *    *    * 
For these reasons, we affirm.   
   
 
